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Abstract 
Politics is central to development discourse, yet remains peripheral.  Over 
some twenty years, a civil society narrative has not fulfilled its potential to 
‘bring politics back in’.  Reasons can be found in conceptual confusion, in 
selectivity in donor thinking, in policies towards civil society and in the 
growth-driven political economy of NGO-ism.  Remedies for the political 
lacunae are being sought through a focus on rights, citizenship and leadership 
that show valuable, focused progress. This article examines a comprehensive 
complement to such efforts referred to as civic driven change (CDC).  
Originating in a grounded empirical approach, the constituent principles and 
elements of CDC offer a lens that can both sharpen and deepen insights and 
advance analysis of socio-political processes. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The insertion of ‘civil society’ into development debates has not lived up to expectations.  The 
concepts’ theoretical provenance offered an opportunity to respond to an oft repeated call to ‘bring 
politics back in’ to an essential position within aided development thinking and practice (e.g., 
Berntzen and Selle; 1990; Nederveen-Pieterse, 2002; Hickey, 2009).1  Some twenty years of 
experience shows that selective variations of ‘civil society’ have been deployed by many member 
governments of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in support of a 
utilitarian interpretation and agenda propagating a western universalism into the world order 
(Wallerstein, 2006).  The international aid system has been one important mechanism for doing so.  
A shift of policy perspectives from nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) in a ‘third sector’ to civil 
society as a political category offered an opportunity to re-think development in terms of the 
evolution of power relations between a state and the polity.  It also offered a conveniently messy 
empirical category that could politically legitimate the conditionality of aid funding.  Yet, over this 
period, civil society discourse has not managed to “(…) establish politics as a central concern within 
development studies” (Hickey, 2009:141).   
 
The fact that official aid for development and the dominant narrative of development itself are 
political instruments in a repertoire of international relations is hardly contested.  Riddell (2007:398) 
contends that until aid is de-coupled from the systemic problems stemming from the bi-lateral 
interests of donor countries the quest for greater effectiveness will remain undermined.  Yet, this 
reality is masked by assertions of poverty as the guiding criteria for aid with the Millennium 
Development Goals acting as the public justification overlaying the deeper real-politic of aid 
allocations shown in their volatility an unreliability (Cogneau and Naudet, 2007; Bulir and Hamman, 
2008; Faust, 2010).  Whichever way one approaches aided development, politics matters a lot.  This 
article describes an ongoing effort to bring politics and socio-political processes into the core of 
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development discourse and policies.2  It details the substance of ‘civic driven change’ (CDC) as a 
novel narrative recognising, but conceptually relocating, civil society.   
 
CIVIL SOCIETY AS A DISCOURSE 
Triggered by the implosion of authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Asia and Central Europe in the 
1990s, a re-emergence of the notion of civil society into political theory with its contested meanings 
and interpretations is well documented and critiqued (e.g., Cohen and Arato, 1992; Hann and Dunn, 
1996; Deakin, 2001; Hodgkinson and Foley, 2003; Chambers and Kymlicke, 2003; Edwards, 2004). 
Narrow geo-historical origins of some two hundred years in Western Europe and North America 
spurred debates on the concept’s broader international validity (e.g., Blaney and Pasha, 1993; 
Kumar, 1993; Mamdani, 1996; Lewis, 2003) which have not produced a convincing outcome.  In this 
sense, the search for a resolution of a civil society narrative has reached a dead end or remains an 
ongoing challenge.  In either case, empirical study and resolution of contending positions is 
exacerbated by the difficulties of applying the concept to countries such as China and Vietnam which 
are adopting market economic principles while maintaining socio-political configurations deeply 
rooted in communism (Howell, 1993; Howell and Pearce, 2001). 
 
It can be argued that civil society has been so variously understood as to be almost meaningless in 
terms of providing a coherent conceptual and empirical political-analytic framework.  For example, 
the concept is used in a singular fashion, arguing that there is a ‘civil society position’ or a ‘civil 
society interest’, thereby ignoring those that disagree.  A condition of multiple meanings is 
perpetuated because the alternative conceptualisations on offer are self-referential in terms of how 
civil society is defined and located in analysis of political processes and power relationships (Van 
Rooy, 1998).  This makes robust comparison and empirical validation somewhat illusory.  Glasius 
(2010) argues that a mix and match of attributes and perspectives leads to different versions of civil 
society that satisfy neoliberal, liberal, radical and post-modern predispositions.  Such a rendition 
corresponds to a debate which seems to be unable to advance a compelling theoretical proposition 
about the role of civil society in the trajectories and outcomes of ongoing political evolution within, 
between and above nation states.  Assistance from other disciplines, such as international relations, 
does not seem to offer much hope for reconciliation or coherence.  For example, when comparing 
three ‘big visions’ of the future world (dis)order Richard Betts (2010) argues that there is no 
unequivocal sign of a global convergence towards western configurations of state-society relations 
and related internal distribution of power.  Modernization does not necessarily equal westernisation 
and economics does not necessarily triumph over (cultural) identity and dignity.  Consequently, it is 
unwise to assume that an uncontested version of civil society will arise from processes of 
globalization any time soon. 
 
Another problem is that the slant of these normative positions is one of civil society as naturally 
‘good’ in the sense of seeking justice, fairness and some understanding of a collective good and 
collaborative problem solving that are all conducive to (re)establishing social order.  The so called 
‘non-civic’ part of civil society that also drives and act as protagonists in socio-political processes – 
‘clubs’ of oligarchic elites, terrorisms, cartels, traffickers, sects or groups pre-disposed to violence, 
xenophobia and so on – seem to be ignored.  Yet their existence and influence on socio-political 
process, such as curtailing civil liberties, are patently clear.  A ‘warts and all’ civil society, and in 
development itself, need to be better theoretically recognised and accounted for (Monga, 2008). 
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The conceptual and normative ambiguities of civil society described above are compounded by the 
empirical messiness of the socio-political motives, relationships, structures, forms, functions and 
expressions of a polity as its members exert agency. 3 Experience of multi-country research projects 
on civil society – such as the Johns Hopkins quantitative comparative study (Salamon et al., 2003) 
and the qualitative Civicus Civil Society index (Heinrich, 2007) – show a struggle to both delineate 
and investigate configurations and socio-political conditions, processes and agents that are ‘invisible’ 
to outsiders but very much visible to those involved.  This empirical difficulty is being exacerbated by 
the spontaneity and transience of collective-action politics made increasingly possible by advances in 
communications technology where ‘everybody’ can be at the table (Shirky, 2008).   
 
In sum, as currently pursued, civil society discourse is unresolvably too ‘plural’ and its context-
specific expressions too diverse to offer a prospect of a making an unambiguous contribution to 
political theory and action.  In a world that is becoming more interdependent, with states less able 
to solve complex problems and dilemmas alone, a civil society story will remain a useful but limited 
vantage point to adequately comprehend and explain the socio-political processes involved at their 
inter-connected scales.  A more directly political approach is called for. 
 
THE POLITICS OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Premised on their assumed comparative advantages, prior to the era of civil society discourse, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) were the principle non-market driven, non-state actor gaining 
prominence in development theory, policy and practice of the last three decades (e.g., Brown and 
Korten, 1989).  Their subsequent global growth in numbers, scale and diversity makes general 
statements about NGOs problematic – exceptions in time and place will always exist.  With this 
caveat in mind, the advent of civil society discourse involved twin processes of adjustment within 
the aid community.  First, it was necessary to determine how exactly this concept would alter 
existing thinking about how change happens by whom.  Second, was a challenge to incorporate 
NGO-ism4 into this evolving and, for donors, new way of modelling development while, at the same 
time, operationalizing ‘good governance’ objectives and mainstreaming the, then, New Policy 
Agenda.5 
 
Much intellectual effort was applied to the former challenge.  Contending ideas about what civil 
society was and did in ‘big D’ development were identified in terms of their ‘small d’ equivalents 
(fn.1., Van Rooy, 1998; Pratt, 2003).  Others analysts took a more critical stance, pointing out the 
contradictions between the conceptual options on offer.  With increasing NGO dependency on 
official aid, observers also questioned a willingness to make hard choices between options under 
dominant conditions of neo-liberalism (Eade, 2000; Howell and Pearce, 2001).  Expectations about 
NGO roles in support of material improvement and democratization in post-Soviet countries tried to 
combine these twin processes of adjustment to new conditions (Clayton, 1994, 1996).  A moment 
and potential arose for civil society thinking to bring a more directly political dimension not just to 
national development but to NGOs themselves (Clark, 1991, 1993) and, subsequently, 
transnationally (Clark, 2003; Taylor, 2004; Batliwala and Brown, 2006).  Some observers wondered if 
such an unanticipated shift in discourse with its multiple interpretations could re-invigorate an 
anticipation, from the nineteen seventies, that NGOs would offer an alternative, more politically 
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  Following Hilhorst, (2003) NGO-ism are expectations, assumptions, vocabulary and performance metrics of 
public benefit meriting tax concessions associated with western non-profit organisations. 
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 This so-called New Policy Agenda emerged in the early 1990s , and became part of a market-based ‘good 
governance’ donor agenda. Political conditionality became linked to aid delivery, putting pressure on 
countries of the South and East to introduce  multi-party politics, slim down their bureaucracies, be more 
transparent and accountable, respect human rights, advance women's position in society, 
create greater space for civic action and reduce military expenditure (Robinson, 1994; Fowler, 1998). 
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‘activist’ and progressive model of development thinking and practice.  In other words, could and 
would NGOs exploit the moment and re-grasp an opportunity to counter the social-welfare and 
participatory ‘voice’ bias of official aid policy towards NGOs (Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin, 2008:11-
15)?  For reasons set out below, this did not happen to any substantive degree.  The result was that 
expectations about the political potential of (global) social movements and networks increased at 
the cost of NGOs. (Ghimire, 2005). 
 
At a similar moment, the official aid system made a relatively narrow selection between contenting 
theories of civil society in favour of those most consistent with liberal market democracy premised 
on negotiated processes of change in society (Riddell, 2007).  This choice is illustrated, for example, 
in the remedial roles allocated to NGOs, now called CSOs as part of structural adjustment policies 
(Lipton, 1991).  Subsequently, the introduction of poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) 
required these CSOs to take on ‘participatory’ functions that would generate a more ‘enabling 
environment’  to civic engagement (World Bank, 2003).  Sensitive to the ‘sovereignty constraint’ in 
international relations, alternative theories of civil society that embody political disputation and 
struggles for power were marginalised. 
 
Within this overall ideological template, donor policies towards civic society as organisations (CSOs) 
showed modest variation in the mix of concepts employed (Giffen and Judge, 2010).  Depending on 
the donor country concerned, normative plurality allowed for greater or lesser accommodation of 
social-change oriented, so-called ‘progressive NGOs’.  Over time, donor policy space opened up for 
inclusion of other types of entities.  Faith-based groups, trade unions, and professional associations 
were recognised as member-based constituents of organised civil society with a developmental 
contribution to make.  Be that as it may, the ‘intermediation’ function of NGOs in and between 
societies remained the dominant character of what, in many aided countries, became understood as 
civil society.  Correspondingly, in equating NGOs with CSOs, regimes computed the latter as being of 
value when supplementing state social development efforts but with suspicion of non-service 
‘political’ functions, such as advocacy.  A ‘backlash’ against NGOs at the United Nations signalled the 
discomfort of many (autocratic) regimes when CSOs gained a bigger presence and influence in 
(inter)national bodies (Mohammed, 1997). 
 
More directly, NGO-ism served as a financing source to the relief complements of armed resistance 
movements, such as the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Association.  They also acted as a 
‘holding ground’ for political aspirants within the then prevailing autocracies and single party 
political systems.  It was tacitly understood that NGO-ism would and could be ‘political’ in serving a 
donor’s foreign policy imperatives, but could not be overtly recognised as such.  Thus, by and large, 
NGOs did not provoke an open debate on the politics of development and were criticised for simply 
aiding and abetting western interests.  For example, protagonists across the NGO fault lines in the 
Fifty Years is Enough campaign against the World Bank speak to the different political positions in 
play.  The mainstream NGO adoption of critical engagement towards such (inter-)governmental 
institutions may incrementally shift ideas and practices of official development institutions, but do 
not upset the prevailing neo-liberal perspective on civil society (e.g., World Vision, 1996).  Looking 
back, the resulting conditions attached to public financing of NGOs for development activities - and 
the latter’s responses to such conditions - point to a significant, but not exclusively, political-
economy imperative for their self-sustainability that has mitigated against them bringing politics 
back in. 
 
Official conditionality towards aided CSOs has played out in many ways that lead to apolitical 
outcomes.  First, it has discounted the significant diversity of inspirations, contending political forces 
and interfaces within civil society in favour of the service delivery and public accountability functions 
common to domestic non-profit organisations.  As a consequence, an NGO choosing an alternative 
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concept of civil society and other roles tends to self-exclude from direct support from official aid 
agencies.  But, it also means that such NGOs are better able to mitigate against overly growth-driven 
organisational strategies which – in the name of the poor – would make them supplicants that 
typically means compliance with officially ‘approved’ technocratic development practices (Wallace, 
Crowther and Shephard, 1988; Wallace, Bornstein and Chapman, 2006).  However, the proportion of 
official aid NGOs rely on has increased significantly over time.6  This suggests many NGOs have not 
chosen against seeking public finance for their work, often leading to self-restraint in adopting 
development theory or practice centred on politics.  That is not to say, that NGOs are not politically 
aware or informed.  But dependency on public finance, allied to risk aversion, predisposes to   
status-quo reinforcing development practices – service delivery typically wins out over overt civic 
activism. 
 
Second, a predominantly service and market perspective on what civil society has to contribute to 
‘small d’ development has been reinforced by applying the concept and language of a ‘sector’ with 
roots in the economics of comparative advantage.  This ‘third sector’ is often portrayed as a 
harmonious sphere in which all the anomalies of the market and the state are compensated, while 
conflicts between interests and anti-social behaviour are ignored.  A non-normative sector influence 
on identity is reinforced by the proposition that, as a sector, civil society can be ‘enumerated’ and its 
economic value computed (e.g., Salamon, 2010).  Such a proposition and its effects on public policy 
negate and camouflage a civil society’s fluid, spontaneous and politically dynamic expressions seen 
recently in North Africa and the Middle East.  Negotiation within this frame impacts on NGO self-
understanding towards an economic rather than political perspective (Johansson, et al, 2010).   
 
Third, treating oneself as part of a ‘sector’ relies on (accountability) logics of efficiency and 
effectiveness of outputs.  These metrics can also foster identity ambiguity for NGOs whose theory of 
change is disposed towards a more progressive position on civil society and hence on themselves 
(Shutt, 2009).  The portrayal of civil society as one constituent in a tri-sector society model serves to 
either de-politicise or to tightly frame discourse towards existing dominant definitions of reality.   
 
Fourth, as aided civil society, NGOs have often adopted an official development agenda focussed on 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as well as paralleling efforts at donor harmonization - 
the Paris Agenda on aid effectiveness (Booth, 2008).  The absence of politics associated with these 
frameworks is readily observed.  So framed, advocacy and lobbying are, for example, directed at 
reforming governance through public policy and respect for human rights.  In parallel, organisational 
competencies required to demonstrate a tangible contribution to MDGs associate NGO 
professionalism with (business) managerialism and its metrics.  This expectation reinforces a 
common internal/governance pressure for year on year financial growth.  This stance is inherent to 
non-profits as an organisational type (Kanter and Summers, 1987).  An NGO growth orientation also 
typically has its origins in charity, where monetary turnover is a proxy measure of success, combined 
with a business logic and measures in a prerogative to sustain the organisation.7  Together, these 
factors bind NGOs to a political economy of ‘follow the money’ (Albertyn and Tjønneland, 2010).  
This imperative is seen in International NGO organisational adaptations to match changes in 
resource distribution mechanisms, such as donor decentralization in funding decision making 
(Ronalds, 2010).  Moreover, the introduction of market-inspired competitive bidding accentuates 
commodification of an NGO development approach.  Such allocation practices work against treating 
sustainable development as co-produced socio-political processes between people who are (not) 
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poor and those working in solidarity with them.  This negation of people’s direct agency plays 
through the intermediation mechanism from North to South. 
 
As role models, in aid recipient countries Northern NGOs invoke an exogenous understanding and 
frame of reference for what civil society means and does.  A common result is the emergence of a 
strata of local NGOs playing an intermediation role that are semi-detached from their own society in 
terms of norms, cultural embedding and financing (cf. Hearn, 2007; Holmén, 2010).  The processes 
involved correspond more to social entrepreneurship than the spirit of civic voluntarism that NGO-
ism used to portray (Fowler, 2000).  In itself this outcome is not necessarily harmful, albeit difficult 
to sustain outside of foreign funding.  But transmission by Northern NGOs of the economic 
imperative to be self-sustained, works against taking a politically-centred stance to change society.  
Risk aversion is also involved, from which NGOs are seldom sites of mobilization of a followership 
with a political agenda.  While they may help create supportive conditions and helpful capabilities, 
as seen in, for example, in Egypt and Malawi, this type of civic action is more likely to arise within 
endogenous forces of civil society. 
 
The forgoing does not imply that aided civil society has failed in its quest to save lives, help people 
escape poverty, protect the vulnerable, increase resources for non-state actors, introduce valuable 
innovations, influenced critical national and international policies, provided political refuge and form 
important international networks across civic actors.  The point is that these achievements have not 
substantively advanced the political character and foundation for realising development outcomes.  
We are not arguing that civil society discourse as currently applied has lost its value or should be 
replaced.  Rather we contend that the way civil society is understood and deployed within the 
context of aid policy and practice is too limited and de-politicised to illuminate contemporary socio-
political processes of change within, between and above nation states.  Something else is needed. 
 
CIVIC DRIVEN CHANGE:  ESTABLISHING A NARRATIVE 
What has emerged as a narrative of Civic Driven Change is the product of multiple discussions with 
some of the key Dutch development NGOs.8  The debate was driven by frustration at the lack of a 
self-determined and robust story with which to proactively shape how the Netherlands’ government 
was shifting its policy and practice of funding towards these private aid agencies.  Over several 
political cycles, Dutch NGOs - working for 75 per cent or more with government subsidies - had 
questioned state-crafted understandings and positions on what was proposed as its NGO funding 
priorities, criteria and measures.  The Ministry’s perspective increasingly reflected a utilitarian 
ascription of the role of civil society organisations.  Investing in the search for a NGO/CSO narrative 
that would stand in its own right with its own ontology would be a valuable but uncertain effort 
worth taking.  Following a grounded empirical methodology, a multi-disciplinary international team 
contributed to the emergence of a narrative centrally informed by civic agency. The following 
sections concentrate on CDC’s substance with selected illustrations and discussion of its theoretical 
location.  It is a work in progress continuing to absorb feedback and critique. 
 
Civic Driven Change - Composition 
Civic driven change is a composite of pre-existing ideas and theories connected in a novel way 
(Berkhout et al, 2011).  In order to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding and misappropriation 
of meaning, to describe CDC we try to avoid using vocabulary commonly deployed in aided-
development discourse.  For example, in CDC terms, a participant is a citizen; participation is 
understood as civic agency; partnership is understood as a type of collaboration; a policy outcome 
translates into a domain of change; a project is treated as a case of civic agency; and beneficiaries 
are constituencies.  The substance of CDC can be summarised in four basic propositions and eight 
                                                          
8
 These Dutch NGOs included Hivos, Cordaid, Oxfam-Novib, ICCO, SNV, Pax Christi, and Context. 
7 
 
elements.  These form a composite lens that can be applied to illuminate and understand human 
agency in processes of socio-political change. 
 
The individual and comparative case analysis underpinning CDC pointed towards four critical 
perspectives on how society can be conceived and its trajectories understood.  It does so within a 
political framework provided by a nation state and its foundation on the concepts of citizenship and 
rights – both of which can be problematized.  For CDC, the first proposition is that societies are 
regarded as ‘political projects’ where all walks of life contain various types of power, political forces 
and players.  All people act politically in what they do or don’t do with their lives, a requirement for 
political centring in development thinking (Hickey, 2009:142).  Second, civic agency is the principle, 
normative unit of concern where history, context and power to define the situation matter 
(Goldfarb, 2006).  Being ‘civic’ is understood to mean pro-social behaviours that respect difference 
between people and shows concern for the whole of society and not just for self.9  Historically, 
countering uncivil behaviour – intolerance, discrimination, exploitation – are part and parcel of social 
structuration and a polity’s struggle with itself.10  Socio-political change in society is driven by both 
civic and uncivil agency.  A third proposition advances an appreciative position (Srivasta and 
Cooperrider, 1999) on social realities which are understood as the unfulfilled imagination of a 
preferred situation which inevitably create dilemmas of collective action calling for the initiative, 
energy and agency of many (Ostrom, 2005).  Fourthly, development is an inherently uncertain, 
complex, indeterminate process involving societal co-production for good or ill (e.g., Jervis, 1997; 
Beinhocker, 2006).  The drivers involved demonstrate conflict and contention as well as 
collaboration and sharing (Seabright, 2004).   
 
These propositions translate into a set of elements that are connected in different ways by existing 
bodies of theory and practice discussed in subsequent sections.  The constituent elements of civic 
driven change have the following eight characteristics.  In a sense they compositely ‘define’ what can 
be understood as civic driven change in their combination rather than in their singularities.   
 
(i) CDC relies on a rights-based understanding of political agency tied to citizenship that is 
simultaneously an individual and a collective identity.  It is a defining relationship between a state 
and the polity.  Legitimacy of the former calls for active, informed involvement by the latter.  Where 
citizenship is not in play and the right to have rights is not honoured, this enabling condition needs 
first to be fulfilled.  The ideological stance of North Korea towards its citizens, intolerance of public 
dissent in Turkmenistan and rule by autocratic regimes create conditions where active citizenship, 
be it allowed on paper, is denied in practice. 
 
(ii) CDC is not sector-bound.  A CDC lens focuses on civic action for good or ill throughout all realms 
and institutions of society rather than a pre-occupation with civil society that has been uncritically 
conceived as only working for public benefit.  Put another way, CDC is not located in institutionally 
specific ways – it does not ‘belong’ to civil society.  The recent revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and 
similar civic action elsewhere did not emerge from a ‘sector’ but from people in all walks of life that 
had experienced unemployment, giving bribes to stay in business, been compromised by security 
services to spy on their neighbours and family, experienced repression as political opposition and so 
on (Abd el Wahab, 2012; El Naggar, 2012).  These micro politics combine to frustration that breeds 
individual radicalism (Al Aswany, 2004) and mass public dissent with unlikely triggers, such as self-
immolation.  Drivers of civic energy are not confined to the poor, marginalised or civil society as 
such, but stem from the polity at large. 
                                                          
9
  In Confucian philosophy, these two conditions are prerequisites for social order. 
10
 The paradox of uncivil behaviour - like street mass protests and insurrection - for greater civil ends can only 
be judged case by case. 
8 
 
 
(iii) CDC is open and scalable.  Civic agency can be observed at any (aggregate) level of socio-political 
arrangements as well as horizontally through, for example, autonomous relational networks.  CDC 
incorporates links from local to global change and back again as an iterative process.  There are 
growing political effects of aggregating civic agency through social media – again Egypt is an 
illustration, as was the Battle for Seattle at the World Trade Organisation Ministers meeting in 1999.  
While most visible when involving violence which draws mass media attention, such events show 
how what is politically micro and local can self-organise and scale in organic ways nationally and 
internationally.  The UN Global Compact for Business and the impact of transnational civil society on 
multi-lateral institutions are both examples of micro to macro scaling of civic agency, most acutely 
illustrated in responses to environmental concerns.  On a daily basis, changes in household decision 
making and behaviour towards domestic waste and its local processing add up to a significant scale 
in environmental effects but offer no dramatic images that capture mass media attention.  The 
propositions underpinning CDC are not self-limited in terms of the socio-political span they can 
embrace and connect.   
 
(iv) CDC takes as a maxim the requirement for equity of political agency rather than equity of 
economic opportunity that informs dominant sector-based theories of change.  Inequity in political 
agency is often captured in the notion of ‘exclusion’ from power relationships.  Typically, this results 
from a lack of capability for socio-political engagement stemming, for example, from lack of 
organisational skills, inadequate knowledge of rights or of how decision making should work, or 
historical-cultural barriers to recognition as a political actor.  Overcoming exclusion may call for 
‘uncivil’ behaviour.  Naomi Hossain (2009) shows that ’rude’ claiming making on bureaucrats by poor 
women from socially excluded groups can make good against gender-based inequities in agency. 
 
(v) CDC looks beyond political structures and mechanisms, such as voting, to the historical processes 
and fundamentals of power accumulation and reproduction in a country and internationally.  Politics 
in much of, for example, Central America and Africa, cannot be understood outside of the social 
fracturing caused by colonial penetration subordinating whatever socio-political arrangements were 
already in place (e.g., Herbst, 2001).  What becomes political and why in whose favour over time is 
the exposed tip of an iceberg composed of deeper political forces that establish regime (il)legitimacy 
to be recognised but not to be simply interpreted on exogenous terms.   
 
(vi) CDC is sensitive to contention between endogenous and exogenous values, measures and 
processes.  It distinguishes between aided and unaided change in society, which heightens attention 
to the role and power of outsiders in influencing socio-political and other processes, including how 
risks are distributed.  The continual struggle for ‘authentic partnership’ is a well documented case of 
structural power asymmetry between aid actors.  It is tied to money and assumed primacy of 
western ‘enlightenment’ norms and predispositions towards tangible forms and products over 
relationships and intangible processes.  This ‘values’ factor in aided change plays out strongly, for 
example, in prescription of institutional forms that simply will not work as outsiders intend (Moore 
and Unsworth, 2010).   
 
(vii) CDC recognises multiple knowledges and communications that inform agency.  It places trust in 
people’s own sites of knowledge-making which does not necessarily make them right, but is the 
well-spring for learning and self-capacitation.  Farming systems in developing countries have long 
been sites where endogenous agricultural knowledge has gained a place alongside that of scientists 
to steer research investment.  In South Africa’s Eastern Cape, on-the-street knowledge about local 
conditions is being captured and disseminated by a civic unit of a Newspaper’s journalists who set up 
shop in cafes and taxi ranks to directly hear what is bugging people on public issues.  This daily 
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monitoring of what people see municipalities are doing is increasing bottom-up pressure to improve 
public services.11  
 
(viii) CDC recognises multiple types and locations of authority and reactions to them.  Authority over 
and accountability to a polity is located in different places for different things.  For example, in 
signing up for Codes of Conduct and accountability charters, NGOs choose to cede some sovereignty 
in exchange for the collective value of complying with negotiated standards.  In the European Union, 
elevation of political authority to a multi-country parliament while pursuing subsidiarity creates new 
sites of governance that citizens interface with, but may not trust or understand.  The World Trade 
Organisation can pass binding ‘top-down’ judgments on the legal provisions of member states.  The 
Kwanda project in South Africa illustrates how increases in a community’s capabilities for self-
organisation can, from the bottom up, impact on many levels of public authority and policy.  
Examples include:  changes to national approaches to community policing; changes in municipal 
conditions for liquor licensing; local enforcement of bar owners making food available with closing 
times that reduced incidents of rape.12  Poly centricity of governance is an increasing phenomenon 
to be factored into viewing socio-political processes and the institutions involved (McGinnis, 2005). 
 
For any given context and socio-political process, each of these elements has its own scales, time 
lines, metrics and relative weights that are not static or immutable.  Crudely framed, driven by 
inspirations to change domains of life within society, the CDC narrative is often about the politics of 
people moving From Clients to Citizens (Mathie and Cunningham, 2008). 
 
Domain orientation 
CDC relies on the concept of socio-political domain centred on an imagined future of a ‘solved’ 
societal problem.  The idea of a domain has a strong affinity with Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of 
‘social field’.  These are understood as social arenas governed by distinctive values and approaches 
which emphasise their contested nature and the role of power in resolving the disputations which 
are inherent to complex problems and social dilemmas.13  The significance of social fields is their 
detachment from any particular actor because they also exist as internalised mental elements or 
frames of reference or norms and cultural rules that co-inhabit a person’s psycho-social construct, 
their habitus.  In practical terms, a domain can be viewed as a substantive theme or desired future 
condition which holds society’s attention and attracts civic agency from any quarter.  Examples are 
corruption as a non-sector specific uncivil behaviour; as is discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation; or social enterprise heralded in new forms of ‘low profit limited liability company (an 
L3),14 or mega-philanthropy as a composite of public and private, market and on-market principles 
with ‘undemocratic’ political effects (Edwards, 2009).  Informed by an imagined future, domains 
supersede and selectively combine sectors.  A domain can incorporate a polity’s transnationalism, 
accelerated by expanding internet access as well as net-enabled cell phone technology fostering 
social networks and user-driven media (Kanter and Fine, 2010).  Figure 1. Illustrates the centrality of 
civic agency in the CDC narrative.  Though difficult to illustrate in this figure, domains form an 
appreciative, outcome-defined overlays, such as gender equality, a corruption or xenophobia free or 
sustainable society, that are not a priori, actor specific.  Rather, domains firstly invite investigation of 
socio-political processes that co-determine societal conditions and (policy) outcomes. 
  
                                                          
11
  http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/15/52619.html, accessed 29 August 2011 
12
  www.seriti.org.za  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rOnb4HRJTp0 
13
  Social fields, are also found in complexity theory as forces operating and amenable to transmission over a 
societal distance.  Jung’s notion of collective consciousness of a society acts in such a way. 
14
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L3C 
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Figure 1.  CDC:  Illustrative framework 
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Operating within families and often mediated through groups – for example, with religious or 
cultural ties - civic agency is motivated human energy with sources and drivers.  A core task of a CDC 
lens is to assist in homing in on the origins, expressions and combining of civic energy with a sorting 
and filtering through socio-political processes and power to shape collective action and institutional 
responses to wicked problems, understood as selected domains of change.15  Simply put, to deepen 
and sharpen insights in why and how polity, politics and the political work as a society’s drivers.  This 
challenge is described by the Development Leadership Programme in the following way: 
“… if one is taking politics seriously, agency matters. By ‘agency’ is meant the choices, 
decisions and actions of individuals, groups and organizations and, in particular, their 
leaders and ’elites’.  They have the potential to change things. Just as structures 
(institutions, rules, cultural norms) have ‘causal power’ (that is, they have power to 
influence what we do), so too do agents, though their causal power is different …” (DLP 
2010:5, emphasis in original). 
 
Power and empowerment 
Political discourse is about power.  The IDS programme researching citizenship provides an 
accessible categorization and analytic entry point (Gaventa, 2006:2). 
“Power ‘within’ often refers to gaining the sense of self-identity, confidence and awareness 
that is a pre-condition for action. Power ‘with’ refers to the synergy which can emerge 
through partnerships and collaboration with others, or through processes of collective action 
and alliance building. Power ‘over’ refers to the ability of the powerful to affect the actions 
and thought of the powerless. The power ‘to’ is important for the exercise of civic agency and 
to realise the potential of rights, citizenship or voice.” 
 
From a CDC point of view, this formulation is helpful but incomplete.  Applying a power lens to socio-
political processes needs to include theory that interrogates power as both individually socialised 
and embedded and actively constructed by interaction.  This type of analysis spans from covert or 
hidden power to its more overt, institutionalised and transactional dimensions.  For example, 
Bourdieu (1977) exposes power deeply hidden with acculturated world views and resulting 
predispositions towards and interpretations of identity and life’s experiences (Navarro, 2007).  The 
work of Lukes (2005) and others point to additional, progressively overt, expressions of power.  One 
is the function of language to define the parameters of thought and nature of knowledge.  Language 
also dictates public and private discussion, communications and messages, typically favouring 
existing systems of dominance A further influence of language is to label ‘reality’ in ways that 
manipulate or mislead peoples’ predispositions or cause them to misrecognise their ‘objective’ 
interests (Moncrieff and Eyben, 2007; Lukes, 2005:149).  Further, Haugaard (1997) demonstrates 
how structuration of power co-determines processes of (political) inclusion and exclusion and the 
rules of the game in socio-political arrangements and engagement.  Finally, many authors treat 
physical coercion and force as, often, the most visible manifestation of power upon which – in the 
Weberian sense – states enjoy a defining monopoly.  To fully interrogate social arrangements with 
their political processes, a CDC lens should draw on comprehensive theories and articulations of 
power as process and as empirical, practical expression. 
 
By way of illustration, Table 1 combines ways of appreciating the qualities of power as an individual, 
collective and transactional phenomenon that can be empirically investigated, often in terms of civic 
agency capabilities and outcomes The table shows that power should be seen preferably as an 
interactive feature, even though it is exercised in various ways and with different purposes. The 
question of where a CDC ‘power lens’ would focus on depends on the ‘domain’ that is chosen by 
                                                          
15
  We are grateful to Mike Edwards for this observation. 
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change agents? This is turn will have to be refined further through research on practical applications 
of this power lens. 
 
Table 1.  Power from a Civic Agency Perspective 
Power Expressions/ 
Power Processes 
 
Power Within 
 
Power With 
 
Power To 
 
Power Over 
Socio-psychological 
forming 
Empowering 
acculturation and 
socialisation 
Associating for public 
action 
Selecting and living a 
self-determined 
identity 
Assertion in society as a 
personal and joint 
political project 
Controlling 
Language 
Applying critical 
interpretations 
Creating a shared 
vocabulary 
Imposing or 
challenging 
discourses 
Diversifying and gaining 
access to information 
Controlling Rules Knowing and 
asserting rights and 
interests 
Negotiating collective 
outcomes 
Imposing or 
challenging exclusion 
(Co-)determining 
conventions, laws and 
policies 
Applying coercion Questioning 
expectations of self-
compliance 
Adopting protective 
collaboration 
Opposing 
unaccountable 
authority 
Just use of public 
instruments of physical 
force 
 
Allied to power categories are theories of empowerment which link CDC to a family of ideas 
associated with an ‘activist’ reading of socio-political change.  Drawing on the renewed interest for 
empowerment by liberation theology and feminism in the 1970s, CDC is inspired by the work of 
Friedmann (1992) who has criticised the neo-liberal use of empowerment.  He theorised poverty as 
the lack of access to social power, and pointed out that constraints were put on collective self-
empowerment by rights-based tendencies to ‘personalise’ empowerment strategies, so reducing 
attention to tackling structural conditions causing poverty.  Despite this weakened use of 
‘empowerment’, the concept remains very relevant for CDC especially when the meaning of power is 
further unpacked in ways described above.  
 
A central feature of CDC is to counter the disempowering effect of ‘internalised powerlessness’, 
which had been flagged by Fanon (1986), Foucault (1987), and Freire’s (1974) ‘critical 
consciousness’, as well as by several feminist authors (Rowlands, 1995; Mies & Bennholdt-Thomsen, 
1999).  They point at the danger of stripping power from its transformative quality.  Indeed, (civic) 
agency is a tool for targeting disempowering structures.  In this vein, a CDC narrative combines 
toward a theory of empowerment beyond ‘participation’ to a developmental democracy emerging 
though active engagement of the polity which reinforces both citizenship and the state as an 
accountable and effective bearer of legitimate authority. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This article responds to an enduring observation that, as a discipline, development studies is 
incomplete in the sense that politics as process and the political as substance have remained 
marginal.  Recent analysis of development research continues to argue the case for bringing politics 
back in.  We do so through a critical conclusion that twenty years of civil society discourse has not 
realised its potential to make the political central.  While still of use for examining societal change, a 
more robust and comprehensive   understanding of development would emerge if civil society is ‘re-
located’ and refined to sharpen and deepen the political contours and dynamics involved.  Civic 
driven change is a potential way of doing so.  The core of the CDC lens, also identified by others, is 
located in the notion of civic agency as an empirical category.   
 
Experience to date signals areas where attention is required if development activism, practice, 
strategy and policy are to benefit from an additional lens.  For example, a central policy objective of 
aid is to improve governance.  Can CDC assist in taking on board why and how, in Goldfarb’s terms, 
the poorly visible ‘politics of the kitchen table’ remain fragmented or assertively aggregate when 
interfacing with formal political systems and players exemplified in the Arab Spring, in Malawi’s 
13 
 
citizen’s ‘uprising’, or in Chile’s student revolt against the consequences of privatising public 
universities? A central challenge is to further explore the ontology relied on as a source of 
imagination-driven civic energy where complex human drivers of reproduction, identity and meaning 
are likely to be in play.  Another issue is to ‘reconcile’ the normative premises of civic agency with 
endogenous norms and values.  The supposedly ontological roots of pro-social behaviour remain 
open to contextual interpretation that has to be dealt with conceptually and methodologically.  A 
third challenge is how to make CDC-illuminated processes visible in terms of knowledge and 
inspiration.  This requirement is particularly tricky when interventions, aided or otherwise, are not in 
play.  In effect it requires exposing and communicating about underlying forces that inhabit daily 
practices and relations that drive the socio-political factors in domains of concern.  In turn, this calls 
for practical ways to understand and delineate what a domain involves.  Attention is also called for 
in terms of the moral dilemmas of applying uncivil means – such as public disobedience and 
confrontations with authority and between social groups – to achieve civic outcomes.  Finally, an 
issue remains about what, if anything, CDC can contribute to the generally unsatisfactory state of 
effectiveness with international aid.  If aid as currently envisaged and applied is too seldom able to 
support endogenous civic agency without undermining it, can a CDC perspective assist in revising 
development practice towards a better and more honest appreciation of power and the limited role 
of outsiders? 
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